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Abstract—We propose a statistical model, namely Geometrical 
Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) to detect intrusion using 
the packet payload in the network. GSAD takes into account 
the correlations among the packet payload features arranged 
in a geometrical structure. The representation is based on 
statistical analysis of Mahalanobis distances among payload 
features, which calculate the similarity of new data against pre-
computed profile. It calculates weight factor to determine 
anomaly in the payload. In the 1999 DARPA intrusion 
detection evaluation data set, we conduct several tests for 
limited attacks on port 80 and port 25. Our approach 
establishes and identifies the correlation among packet 
payloads in a network.  
Keywords-Intusion Detection; Payload; Geometrical 
Structure; Mahalanobis Distance; Pattern Recognition 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The growth of Internet and local area networks provide 
quality and convenience to human life but at the same time 
provides a platform for network hackers and criminals. 
Internet security hence becomes an important problem in 
near future. The concept of Intrusion Detection was 
introduced in 1980 by J.P. Anderson [2], and since then has 
become an active field of research. According to Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) [1], 32,956 
vulnerabilities were reported from many sources through 
1995 until the first quarter of 2007. These vulnerabilities 
provide opportunities for attackers to launch attacks to 
computer systems and gain an access to the computers. The 
goal of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to 
characterize attacks manifestations to positively identify all 
true attacks without falsely identifying non-attacks.  
Intrusion Detection Systems are components designed to 
detect intrusion and also to prevent a system from being 
compromised. There are three major types of Intrusion 
Detection Systems. Anomaly detection system creates a 
model of normal behavior, and flags suspicious behavior or 
any deviation from the normal behavior. The main strength 
of anomaly detection is the ability to recognize novel attacks, 
and the major weakness is that it is susceptible to false 
positive alarms. Signature-based system or misuse detection 
system uses knowledge base to recognize directly the 
signatures of intrusion attempts. This technique is susceptible 
to a slight variation of the attack signature and also to an 
unknown attack. The Snort and Bro are popular examples of 
signature based intrusion detection system [5, 7] used 
commercially. Specification-based system [6] relies solely 
on the frequency of the input data based on system calls, or 
protocols such as IP, TCP and UDP. The strength of this 
technique is computationally light and does not require and 
need maintenance of many types of parameters, and or 
profile activities. However the weakness of this system is 
that it needs detail design to avoid missed attack types.  
In this paper, we present a new model, called 
Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) based on 
pattern recognition technique used in image processing.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
describes related work in the field of anomaly detection. 
Section 3 briefly describes methods used in intrusion 
detection. In Section 4 we discuss our proposed model. 
Section 5 describes the implementation of the model and 
Section 6 presents conclusions and future work.    
II. RELATED WORKS 
The misuse detection systems or signature based systems 
rely on signatures of known attacks or pre-defined rules to 
match and identify known attacks. Presently in industry, rule 
based network intrusion detection systems such as Snort [5] 
and Bro [7] are most popular. These systems use signatures 
or finger prints to identify known attacks. But signature 
based systems are clueless in case of novel attacks. Examples 
of such novel attacks are Zero day attacks, Mutation attacks 
etc. A Zero day attack is a computer threat that tries to 
exploit unknown computer application vulnerability. In 
Mutation attack, known instances of attacks are transformed 
into distinct instances which have the same power of 
exploitation. Since attack signature is different from stored 
known signature due to transformations, such attacks are less 
likely to be detected by signature based systems.  
Anomaly detection systems model the normal profile of 
system behaviour, and any deviation from this behaviour will 
be identify as a possible attack. 
There are two anomaly based detection systems. One is 
based on specification (or a set of rules) regarded as good or 
normal behaviour, which depend on the human expertise, 
and the other one learns the behaviour of the system under 
normal operation automatically. Anomaly detection systems 
such as PAYL [14], SPADE [8], NIDES [9], PHAD [10], 
ALAD [11] and NATE [12] compute (statistical) models for 
normal network traffic and generate alarms when there is a 
large deviation from the normal model. Some of these 
systems use different algorithms to model the normal 
network traffic behaviour and feature extraction techniques 
from the available audit data. SPAD, ALAD and NIDES use 
source and destination IP and port addresses and TCP 
connection in the development of model, while PHAD uses 
34 features, extracted from the packet header fields of 
Ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets. For these 
systems the detection rate of protocol based attacks is good 
but poor for application based attacks, as these systems 
ignore the payload contents. 
NATE and PHAD system use first 48 bytes as a 
statistical features starting from IP header and can include at 
most 8 bytes of network packet payload. ALAD models 
incoming TCP request first word or token of each input line 
out of 1000 application payloads as a feature for HTTP and 
SMTP protocols. 
Kruegel at al [13] describes a service-specific intrusion 
detection system. They use the type, length and payload 
distribution of the request as features to compute anomaly 
score of a service request and use chi-square test to calculate 
anomaly score of new request. They group 256 ASCII 
characters into six segments: 0, 1-3, 4-6, 7-11, 12-15, and 
16-256, and compute one single distribution model of these 
six segments. Ke Wang and Salvatore J. Stolfo [14] 
developed full byte distribution model conditioned on the 
length of payloads and use Mahalanobis distance to calculate 
anomaly score. They also introduced the concept of 
automatic clustering of centroids to increase the accuracy 
and reduce the resource consumption. In contrast, we 
prepose a novel approach to develop GSAD model for 
packet payload. Each network connection between a pair of 
hosts will be viewed as an object in an image (to be 
recognized through image processing), and each image will 
be viewed as a pattern to be classified as normal or 
anomalous traffic class based upon the given information 
about the connections. This model includes the correlation 
between various payload features and increases the detection 
accuracy. We use Mahalanobis Distance Map to calculate the 
difference between normal and anomaly of new network 
traffic. We will use DARPA 1999 IDS dataset [15, 16, 21] as 
a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of our algorithms. 
This dataset is not without its critic. McHugh [17] pointed 
out that the DARPA/MIT Lincoln Laboratories IDS test used 
generated data, but MIT researchers never did any tests to 
show that the generated data was a representative of real 
data. Further more they did not conduct tests to verify that 
their attacks were representative of real attacks. The detail 
description of our model is given in Section 4. 
III. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODS 
Various supervised and unsupervised algorithms used by 
researchers for intrusion detection with varying degree of 
accuracy are reviewed in [3, 4]. Some of them are 
summarized here in brief. 
Statistical Method: Statistical methods are commonly 
used for pattern recognition. The IDS observes a set of 
normal behaviour and calculates one or more statistics 
identified by a person or some other portion of the IDS to be 
significant. It can provide accurate information about the 
malicious activities which occur over a long period of time, 
but it is hard to determine thresholds that balance the 
likelihood of false positive alarms with the likelihood of 
false negative alarms.  
Artificial Neural Networks: One or more data sources 
are used to train the neural net to recognise normal 
behaviour.  The neural net then identifies behaviour which 
does not match its training experience. It is a data clustering 
method based on distance measurement. This approach 
applies biological concepts to machines to recognise pattern. 
It requires minimum priory knowledge, and with enough 
layers and neurons can create any complex decision region. 
Data Clustering: Data clustering is a technique for 
finding data in unlabelled data with many dimensions. It is 
an unsupervised method. It can learn from and detect 
intrusions in the audit data without explicit descriptions of 
various attack classes.  
Immune systems: It mimics natural immunology as 
observed in biology. Several models exist such as negative 
selection, immune network model and clonal selection. Cells 
can sense not only the evidence for antigen presence, but 
also danger signals. 
Decision Tree: This can be used to show possible 
consequences for particular occurrences where there are 
conditional probabilities for each occurrence. They perform 
efficiently with a large amount of data. 
Fuzzy Logic: It is a set of rules and concepts and 
approaches designed to handle vagueness and imprecision. A 
set of rules can be created to describe a relationship between 
input variables and output variables, which may indicate 
whether an intrusion has occurred. It uses membership 
function to evaluate the degree of truthfulness.  
However GSDA model uses statistical intrusion detection 
method to identify an abnormal behaviour in the network. 
IV. GEOMETRICAL STRUCTURE BASED IDS 
In this section, we give a comprehensive introduction 
about the GSAD which employs geometrical structure into 
payload-based anomaly detection. This IDS is based on a 
statistical analysis of Mahalanobis Distances Map among 
characters appearing in network traffic and distinguishes 
abnormal traffic from normal ones with patterns. The 
architecture of GSAD is shown in Fig. 1. 
In the following figure solid arrow indicates data flow 
inside the GSAD. The GSAD Architecture contains the 
following 5 components: 
Payload feature classifier: This component is used in the 
network traffic payload classification phase. The network 
traffic data are grouped into various categories by using 
Wireshark based on four conditions including size of 
payload, destination address, services and direction of traffic 
flow. The source of the network traffic can be real network 
and collected tcpdump files. 
Payload feature analyst: The payload feature analyst is 
first key constituents of Geometrical Structure Payload 
Model (GSPM). It is responsible for payload feature analysis 
using statistical analysis approaches and prepares raw data 
for the following analysis phase.  
Payload geometrical structure model: It is the second 
key constituent of GSPM. The payload geometrical structure 
model is developed by using a statistical method for anomaly 
detection based on Mahalanobis Distance Map. The source 
data are well prepared by the payload feature analyst. 
Attack recognizer: This part of GSAD handles the 
recognition of attacks from the input network traffic. It 
compares each incoming packet with normal and abnormal 
payload geometrical structure model, and then gives out the 
score which is the criterion to either generate alarm or not. 
Acknowledge/Communication: In this module, the attack 
alarm will be generated if the score of a packet is larger than 
the threshold and report to the administrator. Otherwise it 
will consider the packet is a normal one. 
 
 
Figure 1.   GSAD architecture 
A. GSAD Model Characteristics 
The GSAD intrusion detection system uses pattern 
recognition techniques. They facilitate the anomaly detection 
ability of the system without the prior knowledge of an 
attack. Similar to other anomaly detection systems, GSAD 
models the normal behavior of the network traffic rather than 
the malicious ones. Moreover, the most significant 
contribution of GSAD is the integration of geometrical 
structures and payload-based anomaly detection systems, 
which has not been considered in other related researches. 
There are two models involving into our GSAD system, 
namely 1-gram payload model [14] and geometrical 
structure model [13, 19]. 
1) One-gram Payload Mode: The 1-gram payload model 
is a payload based statistical model. The content of network 
packets is the analysis object of the 1-gram payload model 
which calculates the average frequency of each ASCII 
character (0-255). It does not take network packet header 
features into account. However, the average frequency is not 
the most appropriate characterizing feature for describing 
network behaviors because the same average frequency 
which can be obtained from some very different character 
frequencies and some steady character frequencies. 
Therefore, some other criteria are expected to interpret the 
behaviors of variant network traffic. They are the mean value 
and standard deviation of each byte’s frequency.  
In fact, these criteria are all derived from ACSII character 
frequency. So, when building the 1-gram payload model, 
feature vector is the compulsory constituent needed to be 
calculated first. For a payload model, the feature vector is a 
set of relative frequencies is the occurrences of each ASCII 
character to the total number of characters appearing in the 
payload. In general, each feature vector can be represented as 
the following (1). 
Then, given a set of feature vectors, we can compute the 
mean value and standard deviation of each byte’s frequency. 
Here, we assume that there is a network traffic dataset with n 
network packets. The mean value and standard deviation of 
each byte’s frequency are described as (2) and (3), 
respectively. 
Here, 
The mean value and standard deviation vectors, and , 
are stored in a model M. Whereas due to the network traffic 
dataset consists of traffic generated by the various network 
services. Therefore we need to classify network traffic based 
on the following features: size of payload, destination 
address, services and direction of traffic flow. The models 
are developed according to this group of features. 
2) Geometrical Structure Model: The Geometrical 
Structure Model (GSM) is a pattern recognition technique 
used to detect similarity between the normal behavior with 
the new input traffic. Although this model has been adopted 
into the research of human detection, it is still a new concept 
to intrusion detection. In this subsection, we present an 
explanation about the practical application of geometrical 
structure model in payload-based anomaly detection. The 
model takes into account the correlations among different 
features (256 ASCII characters). Thus, for each network 
packet, there is a feature vector defined by (1). The average 
value of features in the 1-gram model is 
The covariance value of each feature is 
In order to investigate the relationship among the 
characters, we compute the Mahalanobis distance (indicated 
by ) between every two characters. 
Based to the above calculation, the Mahalanobis Distance 





The above basic formulas are used in the GSM model to 
process a large amount of sample network traffic with 
normal behaviors. The distance maps of normal behaviors 
for each group of network traffic are calculated by (8). 
Simply, let us consider one group of network traffic with m 
normal packets inside. Thus, the distance maps of normal 
packets are: , … ,  , and the averages and variances 
for all elements (i, j) of the distance map are computed by 
the following (9) and (10).  
Where (0 ≤ i, j ≤ 255) and  is the (i, j) element 
of distance maps . The  and  are all kept 
in a model Mnor for further evaluation. 
In the attack recognition phase, an input network packet 
experiences the same preprocessing procedure to construct 
its Mahalanobis distance map  
Then, a calculation is conducted to estimate the 
Mahalanobis distance between two distributions of Dobj and 
the model Mnor. 
If the weight w is larger than a threshold, we determine 
that the input network packet is an intrusion 
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We tested GSAD model on the 1999 DARPA IDS data 
set [16, 21], which is considered as standard data set to 
evaluate intrusion detection systems. In our experiment we 
made assumption that the number of attacks is very small in 
contrast to number of normal traffic. We mainly considered 
inbound TCP traffic only. The experiment has been done to 
identify crashiis attack, back attack, and mailbomb attack 
using 150 bytes of packet payload. 
A. Analysis and Result 
The 1999 DARPA IDS data set was collected at MIT 
Lincoln Labs to evaluate intrusion systems. Entire network 
traffic was recorded in tcpdump format. The data set consists 
of three weeks of training of training data and two weeks of 
testing data. In the training data there are two weeks of 
attack-free data and one week of data with labelled attacks. 
These attacks are grouped into five classes as scan or probe, 
DoS, R2L, U2R and data. 
In this experiment we used the inside network traffic data 
(week 1, week2 and week 3) which was captured between 
the router and the victims. We use wireshark for payload 
analysis and apply some filters based on payload length of 
150 bytes, and for HTTP and SMTP service inbound TCP 
traffic.  
We trained the GSAD model on the DARPA dataset 
using week1 and week 3 (attack free), then evaluate the 
model on week 2, which contains 43 instances of 15 different 
attacks. Test has been done on three types of attacks, 
crashiis, back and mailbomb. For port 80, the attacks are 
often malformed HTTP requests and are very different from 
normal requests. For instance, crashiis sends request “GET 
..//..”,apache2 sends request with a lot of repeated “User-
Agent:sioux\r\n”, back sends an HTTP request “GET 
///////////….” with more than 6000 slashes, which causes some 
versions of Apache web server to consume excessive CPU 
time, and for port 25, the attack mailbomb floods a user with 
thousands of junk emails. It is easy to identify these attacks 
using GSAD model and model shows a great difference in 
the behaviour of these attacks with respect to the behaviour 
of normal network traffic for these services.  
Fig. 2 (a) and (c) show the attack free and attack 
character relative frequencies, Fig. 2 (b) and (d) show the 
attack free and attack Mahalanobis Distance Map for crashiis 
attack. Fig. 3 (a) and (c) show the attack free and attack 
character relative frequencies, Fig. 3 (b) and (d) show the 
attack free and attack Mahalanobis Distance Map for back 
attack. 
From Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we can see that the character 
relative frequency and Mahalanobis Distance Map of the 
attack packets are very different from the normal packets’, 
which can provide strong evidences to distinguish attacks 
from normal packets. The character relative frequencies of 
attack packets in both figures reveal the behaviours of 
crashiis and back attack, which are different. For the crashiis 
attack, the “.” character has the highest frequency and the 
other characters share even frequencies. Relatively, the 
statistical tendency of back attack is totally different and it is 
perfect match with the signature. Around 98 per cent of 
characters in the attack packets are “/”.  
Simultaneously, these experimental results illustrate the 
good performance of our GSAD model in detecting crashiis 
attack, back attack and mailbomb attack. That is clearly to be 
discovered from the geometrical structure models which 
explain the correlation among 256 ASCII characters. Both 
the behaviour models pairs in Figure 2 and 3 express 
dissimilar states between the attack free and attack packet. It 
can be taken as the sign to determine an intrusion. 
 
  
(a) Attack free      (b) Attack free 
  
(c) Attack       (d) Attack 
Figure 2.  Relative frequencies of characters (a) (c) and mahalanobis distance map (b) (d) for Crashiis attack. 
  
(a) Attack free      (b) Attack free 
  
(c) Attack       (d) Attack 
Figure 3.  Relative frequencies of characters (a) (c) and mahalanobis distance map (b) (d) for Back attack 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we present an approach for network 
intrusion detection based on geometrical structure of 
anomaly payload. The key features are to compute byte 
distribution model and geometrical structure model for 
normal traffic, conditioned to service type, and payload 
length. The weight factor is used to compare the similarity 
between the new incoming packet's payload and its 
corresponding model using mahalanobis distance map 
(MDM). If the weight is greater than the threshold, the 
incoming packet will be considered as an attack packet. The 
experiments done for crahiis attack, back attack and 
mailbomb attack show good results. 
In our future work we aim to evaluate the performance of 
our model and validate our results. We also plan to test this 
model on 1999 DARPA IDS dataset for variable length 
payload, protocols and services. 
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